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MILL'S THEORY OF LIBERTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
by
WILSON RAY HUHN*
If a court be really candid, it can only say: We find that this measure will
have this result; it will injure this group in such and such ways, and benefit
that group in these other ways. We declare it invalid, because after every con-
ceivable allowance for differences of outlook, we cannot see how a fair person
can honestly believe that the benefits balance the losses.
- Judge Learned Hand'
INTRODUCTION
During the spring semester of 1988 Justice Bankole Thompson graciously
shared his time and his thoughts with the faculty and students of the University
of Akron School of Law. As Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Com-
monwealth nation of Sierra Leone, he provided us with the deep and valuable
perspective of the common law. It has been stimulating to reconsider questions
of constitutional law in light of a tradition of liberty that is a cousin to our own
consitutional heritage, sharing a common ancestry.
Justice Thompson discusses that tradition of liberty, and specifically the
philosophy of John Stuart Mill, in the context of drug testing. The constitutionality
of mandatory drug testing has been challenged in American courts as violating
the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the fifth amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, the pro-
cedural and substantive components of the due process clause, and the equal pro-
tection clause.2
I wish to apply Justice Thompson's discussion of the nature of liberty in a
more general context in addressing fundamental questions of constitutional in-
terpretation. Justice Thompson's essential inquiry is, "Should the enforcement
*B.A. 1972, Yale University; J.D. 1977, Cornell Law School. Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron
School of Law.
I wish to thank my research assistants George Ticoras for his invaluable assistance, and Linda Klein and
Associate Dean Richard Aynes for their extensive comments and suggestions.
'Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY at 162
(Dillard, ed. 1953).
2Recent decisions by federal circuit courts of appeal have generally found mandatory drug testing programs
to be constitutional. See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department, 840 F2d 1139 (3rd Cir. 1988);
Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986); Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987); Everett v. Napper, 833 E2d 1507
(11th Cir. 1987). In Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burley, 839 F2d 575 (9th Cit. 1988), the testing program
in question was declared unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Von Raab
at 99 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1988), and in Burnley at 100 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1988).
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of morals be the concern of the law?" I take the liberty of slightly rephrasing that
question: "Is the enforcement of traditional moral norms per se constitutional?"
I suggest that the answer to this question is "no." Courts and scholars have often
confused our moral traditions with our traditions of liberty and equality. My cen-
tral premise is that it is for the legislature to enact morality into law, and it is for
the courts to determine when moral norms infringe upon constitutionally
guaranteed liberty and equality. The difficult problem is to develop a coherent
theory of liberty and equality.
Justice Thompson looks to the utilitarian school 4 for a theory of liberty to
guide the Court in its interpretation of the Constitution. Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill certainly conceived a broad scope for individual liberty, but it is not
their opinions on specific questions of individual freedom that is pertinent to this
discussion.5 Instead, the lasting contribution of the utilitarian school is the skep-
ticism which they brought to law. They taught that it is the duty of enlightened
people to justify the existence of every law and social institution, and that it is
possible to use reason to measure the utility of laws and institutions.
This skepticism is not limited to rationalists. Reinhold Neibuhr used Christian
principles in evaluating social conflict, recognizing that: "In every human group
there is less reason to guide and check impulse, less capacity for self-
transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more
unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their
personal relationships." 6
Professor Lynne Henderson criticizes Supreme Court jurisprudence on
similar, but secular, grounds. She writes: "Legal decisions and lawmaking fre-
quently have nothing to do with understanding human experiences, affect, suf-
fering - how people do live." 7
Both Neibuhr and Henderson conclude that it is characteristic for a domi-
nant social group to overlook the just demands of an individual for liberty or
equality and instead to resolve conflicts by the assertion of power. They suggest
3See supra.
4Utilitarian ethics may be traced to Frances Hutcheson, who wrote, "[Tlhat action is best which procures
the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers' V. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 182 (1985)
[hereinafter V. COPLESTON] (quoting HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF
BEAUTY AND VIRTUE (1725)). David Hume's theories also foreshadowed utilitarian philosophy, stressing em-
piricism and individualism. Although sceptical that the existence of God or even the principle of cause and
effect could be proven, he took on faith t at to increase the happiness of others "is the highest merit which
human nature is capable of attaining." V. COPLESTON, at 333 (quoting HUME, ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (1751) (emphasis omitted)). Jeremy Bentham made the utilitarian principle a poten-
tial tool ofjudicial review with his classic formulation: "[Tihe greatest happiness of the greatest number is
the foundation of morals and legislation." J. BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789).
5Mill, for example, thought that laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol were "gross usurpations upon the liber-
ty of private life' and that the law forbidding the importation of opium into China was an objectionable in-
terference with the liberty of the buyer. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY, at 100, 108.
6 NEIBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, at xi-xii (1960).
7Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1574-75 (1987).
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MILUS THEORY OF LIBERTY
that justice is possible only when the dominant group identifies with the individual
or the minority, and that this takes an act of faith8 or empathy 9 on the part of that
group.
The principle of limited government is not premised upon the desire of in-
dividuals for personal aggrandizement; individuals acting from selfish motives
would not agree to refrain from exploiting a powerless minority. Instead, the
theory of limited government is based upon principles of sacrifice and self-re-
straint.' 0 Just as each individual is obliged to refrain from causing harm, so the
collective is obliged to refrain from regulating the individual except to prevent
harm.
We may achieve an understanding of the needs of others through either
religious or emotive powers, but this is only a starting point. Only through reason
is it possible to balance the competing interests of society and the individual; and
courts are far more likely than legislatures to conduct that balancing process ob-
jectively, rather than in response to the power of the dominant social group.
Ultimately, it is the function of the Supreme Court to require the dominant
social group to act tolerantly towards minorities and individuals.
THREE DEFINITIONS OF LIBERTY
The President of the United States addressed the definition of liberty in these
words:
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty. And the
American people are just now much in want of one. We all declare for liberty;
but in using the same word we do not mean the same thing. With some, the
word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself and
the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some
men to do as they please with other men and the product of the other men's
gJames W. Fowler describes "universalizing faith" as transcending moral and religious traditions. Persons
of such faith, such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mother Teresa "may offend our parochial percep-
tions of justice" and "threaten our measured standards-of righteousness and goodness and prudence." J.
FOWLER, STAGES OF FAITH 200 (1981).
9Modern scholars have observed that women resolve conflicts differently than men:
[W]omen resolve conflicts not by invoking a logical heirarchy of abstract principles but through try-
ing to understand the conflict in the context of each person's perspective, needs, and goals - and do-
ing the best possible for everyone that is involved.
BELENKY, CLINCHY, GOLDBERGER, & TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING 149 (1973). Sociological studies
support this hypothesis. See GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 69-73 (1982). This empathetic, feminist analysis
of moral questions is perfectly consistent with utilitarian analysis. Both are empirical rather than concep-
tual. Both reject traditionalist and positivist resolutions of conflict. Both require a candid balancing of
everyone's interests.
10 Gandhi embraced the principles of individual freedom and limited government. He stated:
In [the ideal] state everyone is his own ruler. He rules himself in such a manner that he is never a hin-
drance to his neighbor. In the ideal state, therefore, there is no political power because there is no state.
But the ideal is never fully realized in life. Hence the classical statement of Thoreau that that govern-
ment is best which governs least.
THE WOwS OF GANDHI 36 (Attenborough, ed. 1982). In speaking of Russia, he said, "[lit is beneath human
dignity to lose one's individuality and become a mere cog in the machine." Id. at 33.
Fall, 1988]
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labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatible things, called by
the same name - liberty. And it follows that each of the things is by the
respective parties called by two different and incompatible names - liber-
ty and tyranny.
The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep
thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same
act.... Plainly the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of
liberty.'I
Three definitions of liberty are suggested below: A utilitarian definition, a
definition which relies upon the original intent of the framers, and definition
which is based upon tradition.
Mill's Theory of Liberty
The central premise of Mill's libertarian philosophy is: "There is a limit to
the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence;
and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable
to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism" 12
The central problem, as he saw it, was to develop a "recognized principle by which
the propriety or impropriety of government interference" could be measured.
3
Like earlier philosophers of the utilitarian school Mill flatly rejected "custom"
as a guide in favor of "utility." 14 The test, Mill said, is whether the individual is
harming others by his actions: "If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is
aprimafacie case for punishing him .... 1" A key point is that Mill refused to
recognize the causing of moral outrage as a "hurtful act" 6 Behavior is punishable
"Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, April 18, 1864, VII THE COLLECrED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 301-302 (1953) (emphasis in original).
12J. MILL, supra note 5, at 11.
31d. at 15.
14Mill said, "I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions." Id. at 17. In rejecting tradition
he noted:
What these rules [of conduct] should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we except
a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving.
No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country
is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age or country no more suspect any difficulty in
it, than if it were a subject on which mankind has always been agreed. The rules which obtain among
themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the
examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says a second nature,
but is continually mistaken for the first.
Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
I d. at 17.
16 Mill stated:
There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for,
and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the
religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in
their abominable worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own
opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire
of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it.
Id. at 95.
[Vol. 22:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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MILL'S THEORY OF LIBERTY
only where "there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an
individual or to the public." ' 7
Original Intent
Mill branded laws and institutions which unreasonably interfered with in-
dividual liberty as "illegitimate." ' 8 Some modern legal theorists have taken the
position that the legitimacy of decisions interpreting the Constitution springs from
the "theory" that is cited in support of the decision. Judge Robert H. Bork, in
his celebrated "neutral principles" article, observed:
For it follows that the Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can
demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from
the Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority and minority freedom.
If it does not have such a theory but merely imposes its own value choices,
or worse if it pretends to have a theory but actually follows its own predilic-
tions, the Court violates the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone
justifies its power.t9
Judge Bork proposed that "original intent" is the only valid theory of con-
stitutional interpretation. He would accept as fundamental only those rights which
the Framers actually intended, and other rights necessary to the governmental
process.20 Many scholars and justices agree that when the Supreme Court fails
to base a decision upon the "original intent" of the framers, that it is without
legitimacy.2' In the eyes of those whose touchstone is "original intent," the judicial
decisions which are least legitimate are those which expanded or invented fun-
damental constitutional rights, rights which were contrary to cultural tradition
and legal precedent: Brown v. Board of Education,2 2 Baker v. Car,23 New York
171d. at 93.
'
8 For example, Mill called sabbatarian legislation an "illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of
the individual." Id. at 102.
19Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971).
20 There appear to be two proper methods of deriving rights from the Constitution. The first is to take
from the document rather specific values that text or history show the framers actually to have intended
and which are capable of being translated into principled rules. We may call these specified rights. The
second method derives rights from governmental processes established by the Constitution. These are
secondary or derived individual rights. This latter catagory is extraordinarily important. This method
of derivation is essential to the interpretation of the first amendment, to voting rights, to criminal pro-
cedure and to much else.
Id. at 17.
The theory by which the Supreme Court recognizes implied rights which enhance people's participation
in government was further developed by John Hart Ely in his treatise DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT (1980). He
refers to the Court's function of protecting political participation as "representation-reinforcement."
2t See, e.g., Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976); BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
22347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring state-imposed segregation in the public schools to be unconstitutional).
23369 U.S. 186 (1962). This case, and its progeny Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) and Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), ordered reapportionment of legislative districts to reflect equality of population.
Fall, 19881
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Times Co. v. Sullivan,24 Reed v. Reed,2 5 Griswold v. Connecticut,2 6 and Roe v.
Wade,27 for example. Each of these cases pitted traditional values against emerging
claims for equality or liberty.
Tradition
What theory of fundamental rights has the Supreme Court used in recognizing
rights which are not expressly set forth in the Constitution? The Court has general-
ly employed neither "original intent" nor the utilitarian theory of liberty in defin-
ing implied rights. Instead, the Court usually harks to tradition. Implied funda-
mental rights are "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions. ' 28 Such rights embody "a prin-
ciple of justice so rooted in the tradition and concience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." 29 They are said to be those rights which are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" 30 or "the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty."31
NORMATIVE TRADITION VERSUS BALANCING
Our normative traditions are the standards of behavior historically regard-
ed as moral by the majority of American society. In contrast, the libertarian tradi-
tion is that some behavior in conflict with moral values must be tolerated, and
that government is limited in the degree to which it may intrude itself into the lives
of its citizens. The egalitarian tradition is that all persons similarly situated should
receive equal treatment under the law. Traditions of liberty and equality are ex-
pressed in the Declaration of Independence 32 and in deservedly famous passages
of Supreme Court jurisprudence.33
24376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the media are not liable for defamation to public officials unless the
statements were made with "actual malice").
25404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that women are protected against arbitrary gender discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause).
26381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut law banning the sale of contraceptive devices).
27410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state laws limiting the right of a woman to procure an abortion).
28Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926), (quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring)).
29Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) quoted in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937),
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30 Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
3 1Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 quoted in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
32
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."
33The tradition of liberty was succinctly expressed by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928): "The makers of our Constitution ... sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sanctions. They conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." See
also Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 41 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); and see Brandeis' concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), wherein he stated:
[Vol. 22:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Bowers v. Hardwick
The Supreme Court's definition of fundamental rights as "tradition" is
therefore fatally vague, because "tradition" may refer to specific moral norms
or it may refer to our tradition of limited governmental power. This flaw became
manifest in the recent case of Bowers v. Hardwick,34 wherein the Supreme Court
found that it was constitutional for the State of Georgia to make homosexual
sodomy a crime. The majority uttered the formula that fundamental rights are
those which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 35 and "deeply rooted
in the Nation's history and tradition"; 36 it accurately noted that homosexual
behavior has traditionally been punished in our society,37 and it held that therefore
the Georgia statute making sodomy a crime did not interfere with any fundamental
right. The Court held that the "presumed belief of a majority of the electorate
in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" was an ade-
quate basis for the law: "The law, however, is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the due process clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." 38
The question is not, as the Bowers majority puts it, whether "all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated." The question is
whether "morality" per se is a sufficient basis for the enactment of a law restrict-
ing individual behavior.
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop
their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They
valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty.
The tradition of equality was epitomized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886), in which the Court
noted that "unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances ... [are] within the
prohibition of the Constitution."
34478 U.S. 186 (1987).
35d. at 191.
36 d. at 192 (quoting Justice Powell's opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
Justice White, the author of the Court's opinion in Bowers, had dissented in Moore, and criticized Justice
Powell for relying on tradition to give content to "fundamental right." White's opinion in Bowers is proof that
"tradition" is a malleable concept that may be used to constrict fundamental right to those behaviors tradi-
tionally recognized as moral. See infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
37Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Bowers, noted: "Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in
Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards." 478 U.S. at 196. This positivist approach to religious teaching
ignores contrary religiously inspired principles of understanding and tolerance. In effect, Justice Burger
selected the "true religion" by equating it with the normative rules of the dominant tradition. It is well to remind
the Court that both slavery and abolitionism were supported by religious argument; slavery by reference to
the story of Cain and to Paul's seeming acceptance of the contemporary social order, and abolitionism by
analogy to the story of Exodus and the concept of universal salvation. "[B]etween the Christianity of this law,
and the Christianity of Christ, I recognize the widest possible difference." DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Appendix (1973). While the Court is charged with the duty of interpreting the Con-
stitution, it has no license to interpret the holy scriptures.
Another example of the recent willingness of the Supreme Court to allow traditional forms of religious
custom to be imposed by law is Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). In that case the Court permitted a
municipality to erect a nativity scene on public property. In support of its decision the Court (in an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Burger) above all emphasized the tradition of such displays. Such heavy reliance
upon tradition is no more justified in cases arising under the Establishment Clause than in cases involving
individual rights.
38478 U.S. at 196.
Fall, 19881
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The most striking aspect of Bowers is that at no place in the opinion of the
Court or in the concurring opinions was there any attempt to identify the harm
caused by homosexual sodomy, or the possible importance to individuals of allow-
ing this behavior. The Court did not try to balance normative traditions against
individual freedom. Instead, the Court simply held that the Constitution is coex-
tensive with normative traditions.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Bowers, articulated a test valuing in-
dividualism for its own sake when he wrote: "We protect these [privacy] rights
not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the general public
welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's life" 39 Justice
Stevens, also dissenting, reiterated the utilitarian rejection of tradition as a suf-
ficient source of legitimacy: "[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save
a law prohibiting miscegnation from constitutional attack." 40
Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education
The contrast between decisions which rely on normative traditions, and those
which rely upon libertarian or egalitarian traditions, is strikingly illustrated by
the Court's holdings in Plessy v. Ferguson4' and Brown v. Board of Education42.
In Plessy the Court held that it was constitutional for the State of Louisiana to en-
force the separation of the races on railroad cars. The Court cited as authority
"the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, 43 which, at that
time, condoned apartheid. Sixty years later, this tradition of apartheid was even
more entrenched, yet the Supreme Court rejected normative tradition as authority
and overruled Plessy.
What was the Court's authority for its decision to strike down dejure racial
segregation in Brown? It was not judicial precedent; previously, the Court had
either permitted the enforced separation of the races44 or had suppressed it on nar-
rower grounds4' 5 Its authority was not normative tradition; racial segregation was
a passionately observed tradition in much of this country. Its authority was not
391d. at 204.
4d. at 216.
41163 U.S. 537 (1896).
42347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43163 U.S. at 550.
"See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding racial segregation in the public schools); Berea College
v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding a fine imposed by the state upon a college which held integrated
classes in violation of state law); and McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914) (upholding
a law requiring separate but equal accomodations on trains).
45See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) where the Court held that an ordinance drawing racial lines
segregating neighborhoods violated the property rights of owners to sell their homes. See also Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (all finding that the state had failed to provide blacks with substantially
equal opportunities for graduate education).
[Vol. 22:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Court found the
historical evidence as to their intent "inconclusive." 46
The authority cited by the Warren Court in support of Brown v. Board of
Education were seven books and articles by social scientists which concluded that
enforced segregation was psychologically harmful to blacks. 7 In Plessy, the Court
had dismissed the feelings of inferiority generated by segregation as being irrele-
vant to the case.48 In Brown, the Court held that these feelings of inferiority
justified dismantling the system of apartheid. 4 9
The critical difference between the two cases is that in Plessy the Court re-
fused to weigh in the balance the harm to individuals caused by the tradition of
segregation; in Brown the Court considered the harm to individuals in evaluating
the consitutionality of the challenged governmental action. In Plessy, the Court
relied on tradition to decide the case. In Brown, it decided that the harm caused
by segregation necessitated that the legal tradition of apartheid be declared
unconstitutional.
A Balancing Approach in Place of Tradition
There is thus an inherent difference between, on the one hand, relying on
tradition or "original intent," and, on the other hand, balancing the interests of
the contending parties. The advantage of using tradition and historical intent as
authority is that this rationale gives the illusion of objectivity; a court which mere-
ly continues a tradition or enforces the moral norms current at the time of the
framers cannotbe accused of "law-making."50 The great disadvantage of a theory
confining fundamental rights to those rights traditionally or historically recognized
is that such a theory necessarily fails to take account of, much less encourage,
"Raoul Berger concludes that there is overwhelming evidence that the framer's intent was that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not abolish state-sponsored segregation. R. BERGER, supra note 21, at 244. John Frank and
Robert Munro, on the other hand, found a "confused picture" of opinions on school desegregation, even within
the Republican party. See Frank & Munro, "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. L. Q. 421, 459. See
infra note 87.
47Footnote 11 in Brown cited the following works: "K.B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimnination on
Personality Development (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and
Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of En-
forced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the
Psychological Effects of Segregation under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitutde
Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949),
44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. See generally MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA (1944)."
48The Plessy Court stated:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the assumption that the en-
forced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it
is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it."
163 U.S. at 551.
49The Court said: "To separate [schoolchildren] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
50For argument that this is but the illusion of objectivity, see infra text accompanying notes 83-91.
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social growth 5
The tense balance between individual rights and majority rule was succinctly
described by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,52 wherein
he stated:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be deter-
mined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the
course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Na-
tion, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society.53
Those who would accept normative traditions as limiting individual rights
abhor balancing. For example, Judge Bork wrote, "There is no principled way
to decide that one man's gratifications are more deserving of respect than another's
or that one form of gratification is more worthy than another." 54 Judge Bork's
response to the problem of evaluating "competing gratifications" is to throw up
his hands and declare that the task is impossible.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland
The problem of competing gratifications was squarely presented in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland.55 A municipal zoning ordinance limited residences in
certain neighborhoods to single family dwellings, and defined the term "fami-
ly" so as to prohibit two cousins from living with their common grandmother.
Mrs. Moore, a grandmother who maintained a household for her grandchildren
by different sons, challenged the law and prevailed in the Supreme Court, because
the majority found that her fundamental rights had been violated. Four justices,
in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, held that Mrs. Moore had a fundamental
right to live with her grandchildren "because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 56 They found that her interests
51Michael Perry accuses Judge Bork and Justice Rehnquist of moral scepticism: that is, of adhering to the
belief that the "rightness" of ajudgment cannot be determined in itself, but only by reference to an external
factor such as the particular value system of the Framers. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 103-107 (1982). Perry contends that Bork and Rehnquist would find it impossible to
determine the "rightness" of any values, and would be unable to say, for example, that abolition is better than
slavery. Id. at 106.
52367 U.S. 497 (1961).
531d. at 542. Harlan went on to describe the interplay between reason and tradition:
If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it
certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take
them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long sur-
vive, while a decision which builds upon what has survived is likely to be sound.
Id.
54Judge Bork self-deprecatingly refers to this notion as the "Equal Gratification Clause." Bork, supra note
19, at 10.
55431 U.S. 494 (1977).
56d. at 503.
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outweighed the municipality's asserted goals of preventing overcrowding,
minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue burden on the
.school system.5 7 Justice Stevens concurred on the ground that Mrs. Moore's prop-
erty rights had been infringed.58 Four Justices dissented, with Justices White and
Stewart writing extensive opinions on the merits.
Two features of these opinions are pertinent. First, only the plurality attempt-
ed to compare and evaluate the competing interests of the City and Mrs. Moore.
The dissenting justices did not attempt to balance the competing interests, but in-
stead would have deferred to the municipal legislature without determining that
the needs of the city outweighed the liberty interest of Mrs. Moore. Second,
Justice White in dissent launched a vigorous attack on "tradition" as a touchstone
for defining fundamental right.
The plurality opinion follows the standard analytical pattern laid down in
previous cases. Under this approach the Court first inquires whether a "fun-
damental right" has been violated. If it finds that a fundamental right has been
infringed, the Court proceeded to weigh the interests of the individual against the
interests of the State. The balancing test employed by the Supreme Court is called
"strict scrutiny." When this test applies the government must show that the limita-
tion on the liberty of the individual is necessary to protect a compelling govern-
mental interest, and that there is no less restrictive means to accomplish that goal.
Where no fundamental right has been infringed, the Court applies the "rational
basis" test, under which the Court does not consider the extent to which the in-
dividual is harmed by the governmental action, nor does it inquire into the
availability of alternative means to accomplish the governmental purpose. So long
as the statute is a rational means of accomplishing a legitimate legislative end,
the statute is upheld 9
The utilitarian objection to this approach is that it changes the focus of the
analysis from the empirical plane ("What harm has the individual caused?") to
a theoretical one ("Does the individual have a fundamental right to engage in this
behavior?"). When the Court holds that a certain activity is not a fundamental
right, it is tantamount to holding that the activity is without any constitutional pro-
tection. Therefore, to define fundamental right in terms of tradition is to say that
all traditional limitations on liberty are constitutional.
Justice White noted that "What the deeply rooted traditions of the country
are is arguable; which of them deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause
57d. at 499-500.
18 1d. at 513.
59See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). A similar process occurs in equal protection cases. Before
applying the "strict scrutiny" test, in which the interests of the State are weighed against the interests of the
affected group, the Court requires that the plaintiff show either that the affected group is a "suspect" or "quasi-
suspect" class, or that the governmental action invades a "fundamental right" of the group. Failure to jump
this theoretical hurdle means that the rational basis test applies, and the ill effects of the statute upon the bur-
dened class are not weighed in the balance. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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is even more debatable." 60 Thus, Justice White rejected "tradition" as defining
fundamental right, and conceded that Mrs. Moore had a liberty interest in liv-
ing with her grandchildren. Justice White agreed with Justice Stewart, however,
that Mrs. Moore's desire to live with her grandchildren was not a right "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." 6' He therefore found that her rights need not
be weighed against the interests of the municipality, and he voted to uphold the
ordinance because it was not "wholly lacking in purpose or utility."62
The plurality opinion in this case fails to differentiate our normative tradi-
tions from our libertarian tradition. It is not the act of a grandmother living with
her grandchildren (or, as in Griswold v. Connecticut,63 the act of a married cou-
ple using contraceptives) that is "deeply rooted" among us; it is the tradition of
liberty. The plurality opinion of Justice Powell offered protection to Mrs. Moore
because her actions were traditional; in doing so it implicitly approved traditional
limitations on individual liberty. The dissenting opinions of Justices White and
Stewart did not undertake the balancing required by our libertarian tradition. The
case illustrates that there are two potent dangers to our liberty: the danger that
our fundamental rights may be limited by normative traditions, and the danger
that courts may abdicate their responsibility to engage in a balancing process.
The Philosophy of Justice Black
The approach adopted by Justices White and Stewart in Moore reflects the
"all or nothing" philosophy of Justice Hugo Black. In determining which of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights were applicable against the States, Justice Black
took the position that all of them were; not because these protections were fun-
damentally fair in the context of our system of criminal justice,64 but because his
research had convinced him that the framers of the fourteenth amendment had
intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.6 5 According to Justice
Black, the fourteenth amendment did not protect implied fundamental rights
against state encroachment. Dissenting in Griswold, Justice Black rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that their rights to liberty had been infringed; he noted that
although there are "specific constitutional provisions which are designated in part
to protect privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities," 66
there is no general right to privacy.
Justice Black applied this "all or nothing" approach in first amendment cases
as well. He believed that the Constitution absolutely protected obscenity 67 and
6431 U.S. at 549.
61 d. at 549.
62 d. at 550.
63381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"This "fundamental fairness" standard, judged in the context of the present American system ofjustice, was
eventually adopted by the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
65Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
6Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965) (Black, J. dissenting).
67Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Black, J. dissenting).
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criticism of public officials. 8 In contrast, he found that secondary school students
did not have a constitutional right to wear black armbands to protest a war.69 In
none of these cases did Justice Black seek to balance the benefit to the individual
against the harm to society; instead, he sought bright lines in the Constitution,
clear demarcations of protected and unprotected conduct.
These bright lines do not exist. But pretending that they do exist has an un-
fortunate consequence. When the Court finds that a certain activity is not con-
stitutionally protected, the Court simply defers to the will of the majority as ex-
pressed by the legislature. But the underlying question in every case involving
a claim of liberty is "Should the individual, or the legislature, decide how the
individual shall act?" By deferring to the legislature, the court begs the question.
When certain categories of behavior are locked outside the realm of constitutional
protection, the legislature is empowered to make'choices for individuals. That
this result is correct in the vast majority of legislative enactments is no doubt true.
But the legislature is not capable of answering the question, "Should the indi-
vidual, or the legislature, decide how the individual shall act?" Only the courts
are capable of determining whether the needs of society justify curbs on individual
behavior.
The Advocacy Cases
Judges are understandably reluctant to undertake the responsibility of review-
ing the consitutionality of traditional moral judgments. Many of these cases are
close; most are complex. Some decisions which conflict with cultural and legal
tradition have generated violent public resistance. A recurring complaint among
judges is that the balancing approach requires the weighing of "imponderables."
In three landmark first amendment cases, decided over a period of twenty-five
years, individual justices wrote that they had voted to defer to the legislature
because to weigh the individual's right to free expression against the interests of
the majority was to compare "imponderables." 70
The inconsistent jurisprudence in free speech cases might seem to support
the view that balancing of interests is an impossible weighing of imponderables.
During the twentieth century alone, the Supreme Court's pendulum has swung
back and forth more than once on the question of whether it is lawful for a per-
son to advocate overthrowing the government by force.7 ' These shifts have oc-
61New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Black, J. dissenting).
69Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). In this opinion Justice
Black noted that "uncontrollable liberty is an enemy to domestic peace."
7 0Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton 413 U.S. 49, 62 (1973); (Burger, J.); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S 494,
570 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); and West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943) (Frankrurter,
J., dissenting).
71See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (advocacy to resist draft unlawful); Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (membership in an organization which advocates the use of violence to create a change
in industrial control or a political change unlawful); De Yonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) and Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (organizing Communist Party meetings held protected under the Constitution);
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curred despite the fact that in most instances some justices voting with the ma-
jority have expressly applied the "clear and present danger" test: that is, that
speech may not be suppressed unless and until it presents a clear and present
danger to society.
How is it possible that application of the clear and present danger standard
has resulted in conflicting judicial decisions over time? The answer is simply that
our perception of the harmfulness of particular conduct changes over time, and
differs among individual justices. Whether a danger is imminent and likely, or
clear and present, depends on the beholder. Furthermore, the internalized value
of the right of free expression no doubt differs from person to person and changes
from generation to generation.
7 2
The Acceptance of Change
In view of this changing perception of harm, how are is the Court to make
principled judgments interpreting the Constitution? The Court must not look to
what the majority at any time regards as moral, safe, or proper; this is the error
of Plessy and Bowers. Instead, the surest guide is a frank and candid appraisal
of the events and conditions that will result from permitting or forbidding the con-
duct in question. The essence of Mill's philosophy is that the legitimacy of legal
judgment is not to be found in the past, but in the future, by how society and the
individual will be affected by the judgment. In order for the Court to fulfill its
role as the arbiter of the Constitution, and for society to perceive its decisions
as authoritative and binding (i.e., legitimate), the Court must engage in this type
of sensitive, forward-looking balancing.
This assessment necessarily changes with advancing knowlege and chang-
ing social conditions. It was entirely legitimate for the Supreme Court in Brown
v. Board of Education to reevaluate the doctrine of apartheid in light of the new
knowledge that it harms black citizens. 3 It was legitimate to accord equal rights
to women in Reed v. Reed74 when the fact became apparent that women are as
able as men to administer estates. Similarly, advancing knowledge and changing
social perceptions have made us more aware of the harm caused by denying women
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (advocacy of violence to achieve social change may be punished);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (mere advocacy of unlawfulness is not unlawful; the defendant
must have incited imminent, lawless action).
72 Judge Learned Hand, for example, believed that the "clear and present danger" test offered too much pro-
tection for the advocacy of unlawful action. He would have preferred to place the burden on the speaker to
prove that his words would not have led to unlawfulness. L. HAND, OUR BILL OF RIGHTS 58-59 (1958).
7"See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
74404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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an abortion,75 or denying a group home to the retarded, 76 and it was legitimate
for the Supreme Court to recast the traditional balance in light of that new
knowledge.
THREE CRITICISMS OF THE BALANCING APPROACH
There are three objections commonly raised to the use of a balancing ap-
proach in defining fundamental rights. The first objection is that there is no sup-
port in the text of the Constitution for the proposition that the Court has the power
to strike down laws on the ground that they invade unexpressed fundamental rights.
The second objection is that there is no "principled" way to balance competing
interests, and that any effort to do so is a charade masking the Court's personal
values. The third objection is that if any branch of government is to undertake the
balancing of competing interests, it ought to be the legislature rather than the
judiciary. Each objection is discussed below.
Is There Textual Support for Unenumerated Rights?
There is textual and historical support for the proposition that the Constitution
was intended to preserve unenumerated rights against unwarranted majority
power. Two Constitutional provisions grew from the insight that the purpose of
our government is to protect individual freedom, and that government must be
restrained from infringing that freedom.77 These open-ended textual provisions
are the ninth amendment and the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
The ninth amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment states:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States . .. ."
There is persuasive historical evidence that these provisions mean precise-
ly what they say, and that the Constitution protects against government intrusion
75 The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether
is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child in-
to a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, [the] additional
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
76City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
"Bork and Ely recognize implied constitutional rights only insofar as those rights enhance participation in
the governmental process. Their misconception is that we are free in order to govern ourselves. I believe we
govern ourselves so that we may remain free. Compare Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. Califor-
nia, supra note 33, with Bork's "neutral principles" theory set forth in note 20.
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a number of unspecified rights. 8 The Supreme Court has largely ignored the ninth
amendment,79 and, in the Slaughterhouse Cases,80 gave short shrift to the priv-
ileges and immunities clause 8 ' But the Court has set substantive limits on govern-
ment power under the rubric of the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. There is little historical warrant for using the due process clause
in this fashion,8 2 but that does not diminish the fact that elsewhere in the Con-
stitution there is support for the Court's substantive protection of implied rights.
Is Balancing "Result-Oriented"?
The second objection stated above is that a balancing approach is so elastic
that it would allow the Court to reach any result it chooses. However, legal theories
such as original intent and traditionalism are even more amenable to unprincipled
use. Regarding original intent as a method of interpretation, one set of prominent
authorities notes these difficulties:
(1) Who counts? Do we consider only the intentions of those who drafted the
provision? Of those who voted for it in Congress? Those who vote against
it? Those who voted in the ratification process? (2) What is the relevant psy-
chological state? Are we interested in what a legislator expected the provi-
sion to do? What he feared it would do? What he hoped it would do? (3) What
combination of individual intentions is controlling? Must we find that a ma-
jority of the relevant persons had the same "intent"? (4) Are we interested
in abstract or concrete intentions? Are we interested, for example, in the
framers' view of equality generally or in their view of racial segregation in
the schools? Do we care how they would have liked us to resolve the con-
flict?8 3
Furthermore, it is important to ask whether the framers intended that
"original intent" be the preferred method of constitutional interpretation. Pro-
fessor H. Jefferson Powell's research indicates that the framers of the Constitu-
78See ELY, supra note 20, at 22-30, and 34-41, for a summary of the evidence supporting the substantive in-
tent behind the ninth amendment and the privileges and immunities clause. For an analysis of the debate over
the privileges and immunities clause during the state ratification proceedings, see Bond, The Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435
(1985).
79 The high water mark of the ninth amendment to date is Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold,
in which he stated that the ninth amendment "lends strong support to the view that the 'liberty' protected by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments ... is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments." 381 U.S. at 493.
8083 U.S. 36 (1873).
891The Court limited the privileges and immunities of American citizenship largely to aspects of the right to
travel and rights of access to federal governmental agencies. Id. at 54. Our basic freedoms - speech, religion,
freedom from private acts of racial discrimination - were committed to the protection of the state govern-
ments. Cvil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12See BERGER, supra note 21, at 249-257.
13STONE, SEIDMAN, SUNSTErIN & TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1986), at 693. See also ELY, supra note 20,
at 17-18.
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tion recognized a variety of different methods of legal interpretation8 4 He con-
cludes that there was no consensus among the framers that later generations
should confine interpretation of the Constitution to the framers' original intent.
How do we determine "original intent" on complex issues such as race rela-
tions, where the people of the nineteenth century had a confusing welter of opin-
ions: some favored "civil rights" for blacks (the right to contract or to hold prop-
erty) but not "political rights" (the right to vote or to serve on juries), others
favored complete equality, and still others were opposed to any equality?8 5 How
do we determine the "original intent" of the framers regarding unforeseeable ques-
tions such as the right of a couple to bear a child with the help of a surrogate
mother?8 6 What about the vast number of situations where social conditions have
changed so greatly from the time of the framers that we can apply their values
only by way of analogy? 87 Finally, what shall we do with those cases where our
values have shifted so radically that the framers' intent is morally unacceptable? 8
Justice Robert Jackson could not find specific answers in the intent of the framers:
"Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they fore-
seen modem conditions, must be devined from materials almost as enigmatic as
the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharoh."
8 9
The use of tradition as a basis of authority for defining fundamental rights
is no more reliable than using original intent. It only compounds the problem by
bringing the question of determining "intent" forward in time from the framers
to the present. Should the Court consider only the majority tradition? How shall
the Court treat traditions which have become outmoded, especially those which
became obsolete during the pendency of the lawsuit? Professor Michael Perry
states: "There are ... no particular political-moral values supported by either
'tradition' or 'consensus' sufficiently determinate to be of significant use in
resolving the sorts of human rights conflicts that have come and foreseeably will
"4Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985).
"See Bond, supra note 78, at 435; see also Frank & Munro, supra note 46, at 259.
s6See infra note 117 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
sTProfessor Tushnet notes that although the framers of the fourteenth amendment almost certainly would have
permitted segregation in public education, they did not anticipate the expanded role of education in present
times. In drawing an analogy to nineteenth century social institutions, Professor Tushnet asks whether pre-
sent day public education is more like the the nineteenth century's "freedom of contract" (where blacks were
accorded equal rights) or to nineteenth century church attendance (where segregation was and still is observed).
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 781, 800-802 (1983).
"The Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education is probably contrary to the intent of the framers of
the fourteenth amendment. See supra notes 46 and 87. This poses a problem for those who claim that the Court's
legitimacy depends upon following that intent. Judge Bork's solution is to abandon original intent for the relative
safety of a high level of abstraction; in the case of segregation, Judge Bork reads the equal protection clause
as being "intended to enforce a core idea of black equality against governmental discrimination." Bork, supra
note 19, at 14. Professor Berger's answer is to note that although Brown was wrongly decided, it would be
unrealistic to overrule it, in light of the expectations aroused by the decision. BERGER, supra note 21, at
412-413.
"Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952).
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come before the Court." 90 And Professor-Ely concludes: "[T] radition can be
invoked in support of almost any cause." 9'
Those who find "tradition" or "original intent" authoritative warn that a
balancing approach to defining the scope of individual liberty can be used to strike
down progressive legislation. Notable examples of this, say traditionalists, are
Dred Scott v. Sandford92 and Lochner v. New York.9 3 In Dred Scott the Supreme
Court held the Missouri Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional on the ground that
by declaring slavery illegal in the Louisiana Territory, Congress had deprived
slaveowners of their right to property without due process of law. 4 In Lochner
the Court struck down a state statute limiting the number of hours that bakers could
be employed, on the ground that this violated the "liberty of contract" of
employers and employees.
This argument against balancing is unpersuasive. In Dred Scott Chief Justice
Taney based his opinion primarily upon the original intent of the framers 5 There
was no attempt to balance the interests of slaveowners against the rights of in-
dividual slaves, or against the interests of society in general. In Lochner and its
progeny, the Court did employ consequentialist reasoning, but in a manner which
failed to follow the basic principle that behavior which harms others is subject
to regulation? 6 The Lochner Court found that the challenged statute bore only
a remote connection to the public health or welfare, and that it was in reality labor
legislation designed to upset the balance of power between employer and employee
in setting the conditions of employment. To the Supreme Court in the Lochner
era this goal was not a legitimate legislative purpose.9 7
Today, in contrast, similar economic legislation is accorded a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality - so strong that the Court does not even engage in any
balancing process in evaluating its constitutionality? 8 What caused the Court to
change its mind? What set the Court on the road to saying: "What is liberty of
contract? The Constitution does not speak of liberty of contract." 99 Was it the
adoption of a new theory of Constitutional interpretation (such as reliance on tradi-
tion or original intent) that reconciled the Court to progressive legislation? What
90M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97 (1982). See also ELY, supra note 20,
at 60-63.
91ELY, supra note 20, at 60.
9260 U.S. 393 (1857).
9 3See Rehnquist, supra note 21, at 700-703; BERGER, supra note 21, at 266-269; and Bork, supra note 19, at
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (Black, J., dissenting), and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 at 171 (Rehnquist, ., dissenting).
94The Court based its decision on the finding that the intent of the framers was that no former slave or descen-
dant of a slave could become a citizen. 60 U.S. at 404-407.
95d.
96See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
97198 U.S. at 61.
"See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
99West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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brought an end to the Lochner era was not new legal theory, but a changed percep-
tion on the part of the Court of the effect of commerce and the free market system
on people's lives. This change began as early as 1908 when Louis Brandeis
presented the Court with a lengthy, factual brief describing the sociological and
scientific evidence which justified legislation setting maximum hours for women.
The Supreme Court agreed with Brandeis, and upheld the enactment in Muller
v. Oregon.100 This process culminated when the Court finally acknowledged that
laws protecting workers "correct the abuse which springs from [employers'] selfish
disregard of the public interest." 101 The Court now recognizes that commercial
activity is so likely to affect others that government is presumptively justified in
regulating it.
Furthermore, Dred Scott and Lochner suffer from the same defect as Plessy
and Bowers. In both Dred Scott and Lochner, normative traditions (slavery and
laissez faire economics) controlled the interpretation of constitutional right. The
Supreme Court in those cases did not acknowledge constitutional rights which
conflicted with traditional values, as they later would in Brown or Reed; the Court
instead affirmed a traditional value in order to limit legislative protection for an
oppressed slave/worker. These cases are hardly proof that tradition or original
intent is a surer guide to justice than a frank balancing approach.
Certainly a forthright balancing approach can be abused, and is subject to
the limited perceptions of individual judges; but there is still one great advantage
to the balancing approach over those that depend upon a "neutral theory" such
as tradition or original intent. That advantage is that when a balancing approach
is taken, those who disagree with the balance, and generations thereafter, can see
precisely how the decision was flawed. If, in Plessy, the Court had set forth the
goals to be accomplished by the legislation (white avoidance of contact with
blacks) and had expressly weighed these goals against the costs of the legislation
(the injury to blacks' self-esteem, restrictions on the freedom of people who
wished to have interracial contact), then the case would have lost its moral force
as soon this country changed its perception of those goals and costs. Based as it
was upon "tradition," the decision acquired an illusory legitimacy that it did not
deserve. So long as the Court accepted "tradition" as a sufficient rationale for
legislation, and as a limitation upon fundamental right, Plessy was impossible
to overrule. The result was moral and civil stagnation.
Who Should Conduct the Balancing?
It has been argued that legislatures are far more expert than courts at repre-
senting the will of the people and at balancing the competing interests of various
groups, and that accordingly the courts should not arrogate this function to
themselves. Furthermore, it is asserted that for courts to engage in this balanc-
100208 U.S. 412 (1908).
1 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400.
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ing process is essentially undemocratic.10 2
Taking the second point first, it is of course undemocratic for the Constitu-
tion to authorize the courts to overrule legislation; but this judicial power is a vital
check on the excesses of the majority, and is perfectly consistent with the doc-
trine of separation of powers and limited government. 10 3 This amounts to a judicial
veto for the limited purpose of protecting individual liberty. Had Thomas Jefferson
written the Constitution, he would have given the judical branch even more power
to overrule federal legislation. He would have conferred an unlimited veto power
on the Supreme Court.10 4
As to whether the courts are better able than legislatures to balance competing
interests, courts are undeniably less likely than legislatures to respond to the power
of the majority. If it is at all possible to balance the interests of the minority against
the majority, then only the courts can be expected to do so.
Can courts perform that balancing act? Are judges capable of weighing "the
liberty of the individual" against "the demands of organized society"? 1 5
To answer that question, consider the opinion of a leading jurist who opposed
the use of the power of judicial review to invalidate statutes except on "extreme
occasions." 0 6 Judge Learned Hand believed that the Court would lose popular
support if it unduly constrained the majority will, and he therefore accorded all
legislation a heavy presumption of constitutionality.0 7 In evaluating the consitu-
tionality of a statute, however, Hand did not turn to "historical intent" as his
touchstone: "Here history is a feeble light," he said, "for these rubrics [equal pro-
tection and due process] were meant to answer future problems unimagined and
unimaginable." 0 8 On those "extreme occasions" that legislation ought to be over-
turned, Judge Hand unabashadly acknowledged that the function of the court was
to balance competing interests.
If a court be really candid, it can only say: 'We find that this measure will
have this result; it will injure this group in such and such ways, and benefit
that group in these other ways. We declare it invalid, because after every con-
ceivable allowance for differences of outlook, we cannot see how a fair person
can honestly believe that the benefits balance the losses.109
The entire common law of torts was developed using a similar balancing stan-
102Bork, supra note 19, at 6; ELY, supra note 20, at 41.
"'°Michael Perry justifies judicial protection of implied fundamental rights on functional grounds; that is,
that such protection has been necessary to the preservation of liberty and equality, as part of the system of
checks and balances. See M. PERRY, supra note 51, at 91, 135-139.
"°4Letter to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 563 (Foner, ed. 1944).
"°5The quote is from Justice Harlan, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
'
0 6HAND, OUR BILL OF RIGHTS 56.
lO7 1d.
"°"Hand, note 1 supra, at 160.
1091d. at 162.
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dard. The courts were charged with the responsibility of fashioning rules of con-
duct, striking a balance between respect for individual autonomy and the recogni-
tion that individuals must be responsible to others for the harm they cause. Judge
Hand, in a case involving liability for a barge which broke adrift from its lines,
identified three factors for measuring the owner's duty: "(1) The probability that
she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the
burden of adequate precautions." 110 The modern law of torts is in accord. The
Restatement, Second, of Torts adopts a frank utilitarian definition of
"unreasonableness," by imposing liability "if the risk is of such magnitude as to
outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular man-
ner in which it was done." tl
Of course, the legislature may choose to modify the common law of torts;
it cannot modify constitutional rulings. But the point is that the courts are trained
to perform precisely the balancing function that is required to protect individual
liberty and equality.
ARTIFICIAL PROCREATION
The distinction between normative and libertarian traditions in defining fun-
damental right is illustrated by one final example. Advances in medical science
have made "artificial procreation" (conception without intercourse) a com-
monplace event. On February 22, 1987, Pope John Paul II approved the "Instruc-
tion on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation,"
prepared by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith." 2 In this document
the Congregation calls upon governments to adopt laws prohibiting methods of
artificial contraception, including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization,
and intra-fallopian gamete transfer.' ' 3 Among the justifications for this prohibi-
tion are that every child has a "fundamental right" to be conceived by a conjugal
act,' "4 that parents have a fundamental right to so conceive them," t5 and that mar-
riage "as an institution" has fundamental rights." 6
"
0
°United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947). Judge Hand reduced these factors to an
algebraic formula; liability exists when B is less than PL, (where B is the burden of taking precautions, P
is the probability of loss, and L is the gravity of the loss).
I I I RESTATEMENT OF ToTms SECOND, § 291 (1965).
2 Citations to this Instruction are from Origins, March 19, 1987, pages 698-711.
'3The Instruction states:
Civil law cannot grant approval to techniques of artificial procreation which, for the benefit of third
parties (doctors, biologists, economic or governmental powers), take away what is a right inherent in
the relationship between spouses; and therefore civil law cannot legalize the donation of gametes be-
tween persons who are not legitimately united in marriage.
Legislation must also prohibit, by virtue of the support which is due to the family, embroyo banks,
post-mortem insemination and 'surrogate motherhood.
Id. at 709.
"
4
"[Tlhe inalienable rights of the person must be recognized and respected by civil society and the political
authority.... Among such fundamental rights one should mention ... the child's right to be conceived,
brought into the world and brought up by his parents." Id. at 709.
"The child has the right to be conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up within
marriage...." Id. at 704.
115Id. at 709.
1 61d.
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These "rights" are nothing more than an expression of a normative tradition
disguised as natural law. As a theological document expressing the tenets of the
Roman Catholic faith, the Instruction cannot be doubted as authoritative. As a
model of legal analysis it is deficient because it lacks the balancing mandated by
Mill and followed in the best American legal tradition.
What is the harm caused by these techniques of artificial procreation? Does
this harm outweigh the benefit of allowing otherwise sterile couples to conceive
children? If a balancing approach is followed, it is my firm belief that American
courts would strike down as unconstitutional a law banning artificial conception,
with one possible exception. Surrogate motherhood for hire might be banned,
and this ban might be found constitutional, not because the practice is immoral
or untraditional, but because, like prostitution, it could be said to exploit the
bodies of the poor.' 17 On balance, the Court might find that the costs of allow-
ing the practice outweigh the benefits to childless couples and potential surrogates.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Constitution does not exist to preserve moral tradition.
It exists to protect the traditions of liberty and equality, which change with evolving
perceptions of the effect of particular behavior on society and on individuals.
Traditionalists are concerned that the Court will lose legitimacy if it responds
to changing conditions or perceptions. This is a principled concern. Following
the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, public officials resisted and
vowed to disobey desegregation orders. This resistance was one of the greatest
challenges to the Court's legitimacy in this nation's history. The response of the
Court was an opinion, signed by all nine justices, reiterating its purpose in our
system of government. The Court stated: "The principles announced in that deci-
sion and the obedience of the States to them, according to the command of the
Constitution, are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by
our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal of equal justice
under law is thus made a living truth." 1 8
Our traditions of liberty and equality are indeed a living truth, entrusted to
the Supreme Court. To allow normative traditions to circumscribe individual
rights would violate that trust.
I wish to thank Justice Thompson for providing us with a model of liberty
that we can apply to contemporary constitutional interpretation. In both this and
his other work with students and faculty at the University of Akron School of Law,
he has made substantial contributions to our growth. We have greatly appreciated
his presence and his teaching.
117 See J. Moore, Surrogate Mothers and the Plight of Childless Couples: The Comingling of Contract and
Fundamental Rights, (May 6, 1988) (unpublished paper).
118Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1958).
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